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Abstract— The PIN/TAN–system is an authentication and au-
thorization scheme used in e–business. Like other similar schemes
it is successfully attacked by criminals. After shortly classifying
the various kinds of attacks we accomplish malicious code attacks
on real World Wide Web transaction systems. In doing so we
find that it is really easy to outflank these systems. This is even
supported by the users’ behavior. We give a few simple behavior
rules to improve this situation. But their impact is limited. Also
the providers support the attacks by having implementation flaws
in their installations. Finally we show that the PIN/TAN–system
is not suitable for usage in highly secure applications.
Index Terms— Authentication, Authorization, E–Business Se-
curity, Malicious Code, Online Transaction Security, PIN/TAN–
System
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Classification and related work
Since a couple of years we have experienced growing usage
of internet based services in fields like e–banking, e–commerce
and e–government [1]. As the internet and its utilization by
the population are still growing, those services will become a
more essential part of our life [2].
The increasing number of attacks against online ser-
vices shows that insecure internet transactions are a heavy
threat to the society. The most famous attacks are the so–
called “phishing”–attacks. The Anti–Phishing Working Group
counted over 1500 active phishing sites in November 2004
[3]. In June 2004 Cowley [4] reported about a key logging
Trojan which captures passwords. In August 2004 Mikx [5]
demonstrated a proof of concept for a MIM (Man In the
Middle) attack capable of stealing passwords. The Gartner
Group [6] estimated that in 2003 nearly 2 million Americans
have had their checking accounts raided by criminals. Schneier
[7] predicts that this number will be even higher for 2004.
B. Contribution and outline
The scope of this paper is the PIN/TAN–system (Personal
Identification Number / TransAction Number). It is a common
scheme for securing sensible transactions in Europe [8]. As
mentioned above this system is heavily threatened by various
attacks. We investigate why it is vulnerable and what can be
done to improve the situation.
As it is very widespread, and therefore easy to examine,
we initially focus on web based internet banking as an
example online transaction platform. Many European online
banks support the PIN/TAN–system and it is well accepted
by the banking customers [9]. We next focus on spyware
attacks. Later in this paper we will generalize our results and
thereby see that the PIN/TAN–system is inherently insecure,
independent from the transaction platform or the kind of
attack.
In order to reach our goals we implemented and accom-
plished real spyware attacks on real online banking accounts.
Thereby we learned about the PIN/TAN–system, which prob-
lems an attacker has to solve and how to hamper or prevent
attacks. We started this project in 2001 with the master thesis
of Fischer [10] where we attacked a demo online account
provided by a real online bank. In 2002 we refined our tools
and finally attacked real online accounts successfully. Due to
legal issues we had to keep our results secret. The thereafter
emerged real world attacks prove our precognition of the
threats in insecure online transactions. Now we are able to
present our results.
This paper splits into two parts. The next three Sections are
quite practical. In Section II we describe how the PIN/TAN–
system works. This is the basis for the remain of the paper.
For gaining an overview we shortly classify the various kinds
of attacks in Section III. After that, in Section IV, we explain
how we implemented our attack.
The second part is more analytical. We elaborate on new
insights we derived from accomplishing the attacks. In Section
V we see that the customers’ behavior supports being attacked.
The typical (mis)behavior is shown. We investigate how this
situation can be improved by better behavior in Section VI.
Section VII shows that also the providers support the attacks
by having massive implementation flaws in their systems.
Those flaws are discussed. The fact that the PIN/TAN–system
is inherently insecure is shown in Section VIII. Section IX
concludes the paper.
II. PIN/TAN HOME BANKING
At first we examined how customers experience web bank-
ing with PIN and TAN. Therefore we investigated a couple
of internet banking providers. We encountered that all the
examined online banking systems work in very similar ways.
We solely found client–server–systems. They split into
HTTP (HyperText Transfer Protocol) based and applet based
systems. We give a simplified overview of both systems.
The HTTP based system, shown in Figure 1, is the sim-
pler one. The users connect to the bank using their web
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HTTP BASED ONLINE BANKING
browsers. The customer’s web browser and the bank’s web
server communicate using HTTP. All content is encoded in
HTML (HyperText Markup Language) and JavaScript and is
displayed directly by the browser.
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APPLET BASED ONLINE BANKING
The applet based system, shown in Figure 2, is more
flexible. The customers again connect to the bank using their
web browsers and HTML. But then they automatically receive
an applet which is their banking client. The communication
between the customer’s applet and the bank’s server now can
be based on any standard or proprietary protocol. The content
can be coded in any format and is displayed by the applet.
In both versions the bank is authenticated via SSL/TLS
(Secure Socket Layer / Transport Layer Security). This mech-
anism is also used to achieve the confidentiality and integrity
of the data transferred in both directions. The purpose of
the PIN/TAN–system is to authenticate the customers and to
authorize the access to their accounts. The customer receives
an ID (IDentifier), the PIN and a list of TANs from the bank
in an out of band way (e.g. postal service). While it is possible
to change the PIN, the ID and the TANs are unchangeable.
While the ID might be public the PIN and the TANs are secret
and only known to the respective customer and the bank.
In order to log in the user fills in the ID (e.g. a customer
number or an account number) and the PIN into the respective
form fields on the screen. The ID identifies the user. It tells the
bank who wants to start doing transactions. The PIN is used
to authenticate the user. It “proves” the identity of the user to
the system. It is used like a usual password. A user who is
logged in can perform all “read” operations like viewing the
current balance or listing the standing orders. The PIN is valid
multiple times until it is actively changed by the user. The ID
stays valid until the account is canceled.
Each “write” operation (like transferring money or setting
up a standing order) has to be authorized by a fresh TAN.
After filling in the transaction data the user fills in the next
valid TAN into the respective form field on the screen. The
transaction data tells the system what to do. The valid TAN
authorizes the access and indicates the “transaction release”.
Each TAN can be used only once. Thus they are used like one
time passwords. Using a TAN invalidates it (and usually all
its predecessors) for all further operations. The bank will send
a new TAN list before the user runs short on remaining valid
TANs.
Some online banks additionally use a BEN (BEsta¨tigungs
Nummer1). This is a check number which is returned by
the online bank after a successful transaction. Each BEN is
assigned to a respective TAN. The customer can easily audit
this number2 in order to ascertain that the transaction ran
correctly.
The users’s text input is done via the keyboard. In some
cases it is additionally possible to use virtual keyboards, which
are displayed on the screen and operated with the mouse. The
positioning of the curser can be done with the mouse or the
“Tabulator”–Key.
III. CLASSIFICATION OF ATTACKS
We examine the PIN/TAN–system for its vulnerabilities.
Therefor we have to deal with various attacks. This section
gives a short overview of the different kinds of attacks we deal
with. As it is out of the scope of this paper we do not mention
attacks that are based upon compromised service providers.
A. Man in the middle
A MIM attack is a scheme where the attacker is able to read,
modify or disconnect at will the communication between the
customer and the online bank. The attacked parties do not
know that they do not have a direct connection, and that the
attacker sits in between. The MIM software may be located
at the customer’s computer or anywhere in the network.
B. Spyware
Spyware attacks eavesdrop on the communication between
the customer and the service provider. The spy can read the
communication, but is not able to modify the messages. In
some cases the spy is able to disconnect the link between
the parties. The spy may be on the user’s machine or in the
network.
1German: acknowledge number
2e.g. it is printed beside the TAN
C. Phishing
Phishing attacks use spoofed emails or fraudulent websites
to obtain passwords and other secrets. The victims are con-
vinced that they communicate with their legal service provider
and reveal their secrets to the criminals. The distinctive at-
tribute of phishing attacks is that the criminal just claims to
be the user’s legal service provider. In opposite to the other
attacks phishing does not base upon a real communication be-
tween the attacked parties. The service provider isn’t involved
at all.
IV. ACCOMPLISHED ATTACK
The issue of this Section is the question how to outflank the
PIN/TAN–system and whether this is easy.
Our approach to investigate this was to implement our own
attack on the system. Thereby we learned about the PIN/TAN–
system, how to accomplish an attack and how to hamper or
even prevent attacks. We decided to keep the software very
simple. This is enough for gaining experience and finally have
a proof of concept. We describe our attack in this Section.
As the result we can see that it is very easy to outflank the
PIN/TAN–system. We did not need any special hacker skills
to arrange this attack. Some practical experience with online
banking, some basic knowledge in programming and a little
logical thinking are enough to outflank the PIN/TAN–system.
The shown attack was successfully accomplished on real world
online accounts that we own.
A. The idea
The sketch for the attack is as follows: Infect the legal user’s
system with a computer virus or a Trojan containing a spy.
This spy lurks hidden in the background and eavesdrops on
the keyboard and mouse to obtain the ID, the PIN and the
TAN. If all information is obtained the spy closes the web
browser. This is done before the TAN is sent to the bank
server. Thus the TAN stays valid. Then the stolen information
is used to transfer money from the victim’s account to the
raider’s account.
B. The target
We chose the operating system Windows together with the
web browser Internet Explorer as the platform to be attacked.
This combination qualifies as a good basis for two reasons.
Firstly, this configuration is extremely common [11], [12]. This
leads to a very big pool of potential victims. Secondly, both
programs had, have and probably will have a lot of security
gaps [7], [13], which even aggravate in their combination.
Those can be exploited to accomplish the attack.
We decided to attack a bank offering a demo online account
on its web site. This demo actually is for showing potential
customers how easy and comfortable online banking is. But
this demo account can be misused for practicing attacks on
online accounts — absolutely anonymous.
After attacking our first target bank we also attacked some
other banks. We did this to show that it is the PIN/TAN–system
self which is insecure, independent of who utilizes it. In fact
we had to make only slight modifications to our tools and also
succeeded in those attacks.
C. The spy
To learn a lot about building spies, we build the software
from scratch. This was relatively easy as the regarding Win-
dows and Internet Explorer hooks are well documented. But
we also investigated the possibility of utilizing downloadable
hacker software. We chose a famous ”remote administration
software”. The respective sources can be downloaded for free
and have the spying features already built in. We just had to
add the functionality for telling apart IDs, PINs and TANs
from each other and from other input.
Once started, our spy waits in the background for the input
of the desired information. When the victim starts his online
banking activity, the spy collects all information needed for
executing a bank transaction by eavesdropping on keyboard
and mouse events. Having all desired data the spy terminates
the browser before it has time to send the TAN (which is the
last data) to the bank. According to Dvorak [14], the average
Windows installation crashes three times a month. Thus, the
low–brow online banking user will not be too amazed. As we
will see in the following even a distrustful user might have no
chance to cancel or undo the attacker’s transaction.
Now the spy holds the full account information and the
authentication / authorization data (including a valid TAN).
The information is immediately sent to a central server which
uses it to directly remit some money to the attacker’s account.
This automatic transaction requires much less time than the
victim needs to reopen the web browser, surf to the online
bank and log in again. Thus we can be sure to use the valid
TAN before the victim uses it again and invalidates it. If the
victim reuses the TAN he will be told that it is invalid because
it was already used. But as he has entered this TAN just before
the web browser crashed, he will probably not be too surprised.
The user will either think the transaction has succeeded,3 or
he will use the next TAN to execute the transaction.4
D. The traitor
Again we tried to learn a lot, and built the Trojan from
scratch. In order to give the spy software the capability to
unnoticeably be distributed widely, it was hidden within a
useful tool, a currency converter. If the tool is installed, the spy
is — invisible to the user — installed also and is automatically
started each time Windows is booted.
We also investigated the usage of out of the box hacker
software to directly infect the potential victims’ computers.
Everyone is able to download ready compiled binaries which
enable the execution of arbitrary code on unsecured external
computers. A very famous exponent can be found easily in the
internet. It is an open source project declared as penetration
testing software. Its architecture allows it to always exploit
the newest security leaks. The community always programs
the newest exploitation code which then can easily be plugged
into the existing installation.
3if BEN is utilized: and the BEN was lost due to the browser crash
4if BEN is utilized: and receive a correct BEN from his bank
E. The hidden
The wide distribution of the spy respectively the holding
of many valid transaction data records provides the attacker,
beside the chance to deprive many online banking customers,
the possibility to cover his tracks. The raider could, instead of
transferring the grifted money directly to his account, remit the
amounts some times to and fro between the disclosed accounts.
Thus, he has enough time to break away before the trace can
be backtracked to him. Another possibility is to donate parts
of the money to foreign people in order to hide in a crowd
of involuntarily enriched people. In order to be able to easily
apply those and similar obfuscation tactics, the stolen account
information is not used directly by the spy but is send to a
central server. This server executes the account transactions
due to actual tactic and current state. A more sophisticated way
of doing this would be to post the transaction data encrypted or
steganographed to one or more public message boards or news
groups. Then the obfuscation control could be implemented
within the spy. Thus a central server — which implicates a
risk to be discovered early — can be omitted.
V. USERS’ BEHAVIOR
The issue of this Section is the question how far the online
banking user is to blame for our success in attacking the
PIN/TAN–system.
Our approach to investigate this was to examine the typical
user behavior. We did this especially anent our attack. This
Section lists the shortcomings in user behavior we found.
The result is that we found some points in user behavior
which helps the eavesdropper in tapping the data. We further
see that this behavior does not weaken the PIN/TAN–System
in special. It weakens all transaction security systems. We
found some real misbehavior concerning the security (levity,
carelessness). But we also found some behavior that indeed
supported our attack, but not really can be seen as misbehavior
(normal input behavior, mainstreaming).
A. Levity
The levity of the end user is a major shortcoming. Without
having the feasibility to infect end systems with malicious
code the shown attack and similar ones are not possible. It’s a
matter of common knowledge that the infection of unsecured
systems with viruses or worms is very easy. This is also true
for systems where the passwords are weak or even not set. The
worst thing a user can do is to download unknown code from
the internet or from email attachments and execute it. This is
the surest way to infect the own system with malicious code.
B. Normal input behavior
A very big aid for programming the spy was the existence
of something like a predictable “normal input behavior”. We
hereby mean that a user usually fills in the data into a form
field in its “natural sequence”. If, for example, the user has
to fill in his TAN, let’s say “123456”, he will type at first the
‘1’, then the ‘2’, after that the ‘3’ and so on. Finally the input
is terminated by a non numerical character. In the majority of
cases this is the “Enter”–Key, in fewer cases the “Tabulator”–
Key or a mouse click. This is true as long as the user does
not accidentally mistype. As an attacker is comfortable with
having a high probability for getting valid data, the spy does
not have to read the content of the various fields which is hard
to implement. It is satisfactory to eavesdrop on the keyboard
input stream and the mouse position and clicks. By doing this
one can easily grep the substrings which consists of numbers
only. Having these number strings you just have to tell apart
IDs, PINs, TANs and the various account numbers from each
other. Those things emerged as very easy to implement.
C. Carelessness
We talked with various people using online banking and
experienced the following:
• Most people do not care about the security of online
banking at all, until they are asked about it.
• Most people have the opinion that the PIN/TAN–system
is secure just because the online banks utilize it.
• Most of the people think the bank clerk is an expert for
online banking security.
• Most people did not change to more secure systems after
being told about the weakness of the PIN/TAN–system.
Surely our survey is not fully representative, but at any rate it
shows the tendencies. The average online banking user is to
blame for having nearly blind trust in the “institution bank”.
They do not show the necessary responsibility for their own
concerns.
D. Mainstreaming
As already mentioned in section IV-B it is more efficient
for an attacker to concentrate on popular systems. The more
a system is used the more potential victims exist. This means
on the other hand the more popular your system is the higher
is the probability to become a victim. Thus, using a popular
banking client on a popular operating system for contacting
a popular online bank is, under the aspect of security, a bad
idea.
VI. IMPROVED BEHAVIOR
The issue of this Section is the question whether attacks can
be hampered or prevented by the users on their own.
Our approach to investigate this was to improve the behavior
we discussed in Section V. We consider only measures which
can be applied by the willing customer on his own initiative,
without being dependent on the cooperation of the online bank.
This Section proposes rules for an improved user behavior.
As the result we see that there are some measures which
can be applied by the customer to improve the situation. But
we see also that those measures are trivial, uncomfortable or
strange. In addition their impact is limited. They only prevent
very simple attacks. More sophisticated attacks are barely
hampered. Thus there must be other faults in the system which
enable attacking the system.
A. Prudence
This Section addresses the shortcomings explained in Sec-
tion V-A. As a basic principle each computer shall be secured
properly, independent from the usage purpose. If a computer
deals with sensitive data — as it is the case when using it
for online banking — this will be a mandatory task for the
prudent user. There are a couple of (easy) things to be done
to hamper an infection with malicious code:
• Use anti–spyware, anti–virus, and firewall software.
• Keep the above mentioned, the operating system and your
other applications up–to–date by always having the latest
security updates and patches installed.
• Do not execute unknown code downloaded from the
internet or received by email.
• Use strong passwords. Be aware that malicious code
might try to guess your passwords.
• Stay up–to–date in IT–security concerns. Subscribe to
an IT–security newsletter or frequently visit a respective
website.
Naturally this does not protect a system to 100%. But
it increases the security noticeably. It prevents infections
which use simple tricks or are based on older security holes.
Infecting well secured systems is very hard and requires a
high amount of special know how and criminal energy. Similar
recommendations are made since a couple of years e.g. [15]
or [16].
B. Confusion
To improve the behavior described in Section V-B do not
enter your data in the “natural” order. This means use some
or all of the following tricks for confusing a potential spy.
• Do not fill the form from the left upper corner to the
right lower corner. Choose the sequence of filling in the
individual fields randomly.
• Do not fill the individual fields from the left to the right.
Fill a field just partly, jump to another filed, fill it partly,
jump back, complete this field, and so on.
• Insert a mistype from time to time and make intensive
use of the “Del”– and “Backspace”–Key
• Change the position of the cursor with various methods.
Use the “Tab”– and “Backtab”–Key, the mouse and the
cursor keys randomly.
• Use the “Copy and Paste”–Mechanism for filling the
fields.
Spyware which is not confused by those measures must
be able to read and interpret individual form fields. Building
such software is much harder than just installing a “blind”
eavesdropper on the input devices. Thus, although these hints
do not fend off all possible versions of spyware, they at least
protect against a part of them. But we see also that those
recommendations are strange and uncomfortable.
C. Carefulness
This Section addresses the shortcomings mentioned in Sec-
tion V-C. The simple rule here is: “Care about security.” Be
aware that a bank is in first degree a commercial organization
with the primary goal to draw profit. Online banking is much
cheaper for the bank than having a lot of branches full of
clerks. If the people pay more attention to security while
choosing their online banks, the banks are forced to introduce
more secure systems.
D. Individualization
For avoiding the misconduct figured out in Section V-D
one should not use software used by many others. Choose
an operating system, a service provider and client software
which are not very widespread. Certainly individualization
does not protect your system but it decreases the probability to
be attacked noticeably. As noted in Section IV-B an attacker
probably will concentrate on very popular systems to gain a
big amount of possible victims.
VII. IMPLEMENTATION FLAWS
In the preceding Section we saw that the users have little
to no chance to increase the security in dealing with the
PIN/TAN–system. The issue of this Section is the ques-
tion whether the banks make mistakes in dealing with the
PIN/TAN–System.
Our approach to investigate this was to search for flaws in
implementing the PIN/TAN–system. The banks surely would
not reveal their implementations to us. Thus we focused on
those details which can be revealed through the normal usage
of the system. For this purpose we opened some accounts with
German banks offering online services. This Section lists the
implementation flaws we found there.
The Result is that there are some heavy implementation
flaws which really simplify attacks like the one we showed
here. It revealed that we exploited some of the found im-
plementation flaws in our attack. All flaws are not special
PIN/TAN–system implementation errors. They weaken all
online transaction security systems. They can be fixed without
making changes to the PIN/TAN–system. It is on the providers
to do so. We have a work in progress [17] where we propose
suitable measures.
A. Aborting transactions
A big flaw, if not the major flaw, is aborting the transaction
if the TAN does not arrive at the service–provider. Whatever
a user sends to the service provider will be handled as never
arrived if the authorizing TAN does not arrive. This means that
the service provider will accept a new transaction from this
user without any further measurements. It does not matter that
the previous transaction was aborted in an exceptional way.
Thus an attacker can easily obtain a valid and usable TAN by
allowing all user data to be passed over to the service provider
and just intercepting the TAN. This is exactly what we did in
our attack.
B. Concurrent sessions
Another failure was the admission of concurrent sessions of
the same user. It does not matter that a user is already logged
in, it is possible to log in again, even from a different site. It
does not matter that the user is about to commit a transaction
from site A, the same user can start and commit a concurrent
transaction from site B. Even if this might be comfortable, it
is probably not necessary and for sure it is dangerous. This
means a local spy does not have to intercept the TAN. If
the spy has a concurrent session open, it is sufficient to just
eavesdrop on the TAN and use it at first. This should be no
problem as an automatic detection and usage of a TAN is for
sure faster than the human break between typing in the last
digit of the TAN and pressing the “Enter” button. Another
effect is that intercepting spies do not have to care for session
timeouts or similar things. They can log in as soon as all
necessary data is available. This is the way we exploited this
gap.
C. Distinguishability
The easy distinguishability of the various user inputs is a
further fault. It is very easy to tell the ID, the PIN and the
TAN apart from each other and the remaining input. Firstly,
they appear in a given order. This means an attacker knows
which information comes next. Secondly, they differ in their
length and the allowed characters. This means an attacker
knows where a special piece of information ends and where
the next starts. Thus, an attacker does not have to read and
interpret the various form fields. It is sufficient to eavesdrop
on the data stream to grip the desired information. Our spy
works this way.
D. HTML simplicity
The next fault is the very simple and straight forward HTML
code used by the providers. The sequence of the web sites,
their respective URL (Uniform Resource Locator) and the
names of the POST data variables are always the same. We
experienced only once a minimal change after one provider
updated his web appearance. This makes it very easy to
implement robots which execute automatic transactions with
stolen access data. Such a robot is part of our attack.
E. Insecure out of band mechanism
An interesting flaw is the usage of insecure out of band
mechanisms to exchange the access information. The ID, the
PIN and the lists of TANs are sent with (paper) mail in
separate letters. Normally with a few days between them (but
one time they came at the same day). The providers do not
tell the customers when the letters should arrive. There is no
direct feedback whether the mail has reached the addressee.
Thus, stealing the access data out of the customers (physical)
mailboxes is an easy way for obtaining them. We did not
exploit this flaw, since it is not suitable for electronic mass
attacks.
VIII. ENERVATIONS OF THE PIN/TAN–SYSTEM
All failings we found up to now weaken the PIN/TAN–
system. But they are not special PIN/TAN–system failings.
Further more up to now we focused on spyware attacks. The
issue of this Section is whether the PIN/TAN–system has
inherent flaws and whether those regard all kinds of attacks.
Our approach to investigate this was to take a detailed and
somewhat theoretical look at the PIN/TAN–system. We did
not focus on our initial scenario but investigated the raw and
abstract form of a PIN/TAN–system. This Section lists all
weaknesses we found.
The Result is that the PIN/TAN–system is inherently weak
because it has heavy flaws. This is the reason why it is not
possible to protect the original system against the mentioned
attacks. Thus the PIN/TAN–system is unsuitable for securing
online transactions. It revealed that we exploited some of the
found inherent flaws. It is on the providers to utilize better
authentication / authorization schemes. We have a work in
progress [17] where we propose new schemes.
A. Impersonation
From the theoretical view the PIN/TAN–system provides
authentication and authorization by knowledge. Who ever
knows the ID and the PIN is able to log in. The provider will
accept the holder as the respective legal user. Who in addition
knows valid TANs is able to perform online transactions.
The provider will accept each transaction as authorized by
the respective legal user. And this without any additional
arrangements and from everywhere in the world. This means
obtaining the valid ID, PIN and TANs is enough to be able to
completely impersonate the respective legal user.
B. Clear text
The ID, the PIN and the TANs are typed in unaltered,
complete and in clear text into the computer. Thus valid
authentication and authorization data can be obtained by just
somehow “stealing” the victims input. It is not necessary to
obtain the original PIN letter or the original list of TANs.
C. Replay
The ID stays valid as long as the online account exists. The
PIN stays valid until it is actively changed, regardless if it
is used or not. Thus the login event is vulnerable to replay
attacks. Who ever is able to eavesdrop on a successful login
is (with a high probability) able to login as the victim.
D. Relationship
There is no conjunction between a valid TAN and the
thereof authorized transaction. Each valid TAN can be used for
any transaction. This means intercepting a valid TAN which is
designated by the victim to authorize transaction A can be used
by the attacker to authorize an absolutely different transaction
B.
E. Dependence
The PIN/TAN–system has no arrangements to detect (or
prevent) the eavesdropping, the interception or the exchange
of the users input. This must be accomplished by another
mechanism which has to be used in conjunction with the
PIN/TAN–system. If this mechanism is weak or does not fit
perfectly, this presents a gap which can be exploited by an
attacker.
F. Receipt
The PIN/TAN–system does not offer revisable receipts to
the user. The user has no chance to prove to a third party that
he instructed a certain transaction to the service provider. As
the user and the service provider both know the valid BENs
they can not be used by the user to prove this. Furthermore
the used BEN depends only on the used TAN and not on the
actual transaction. In case of discrepancies between the user
and the service provider those must be solved by arrangements
in the contract or by goodwill.
G. Repudiation
The PIN/TAN–system does not offer revisable orders to the
bank. The bank has no chance to prove to a third party that
the user has instructed a certain transaction. As the user and
the service provider both know the valid TANs they can not
be used by the bank to prove this. Furthermore the used TAN
depends only on their sequence in the list of TANs and not
on the actual transaction. In case of discrepancies between
the user and the service provider those must be solved by
arrangements in the contract or by goodwill.
IX. CONCLUSION
We showed that it is easy to outflank the PIN/TAN–system.
We proved this by accomplishing attacks on real online
transaction systems. It emerged that the described attack is
particularly dangerous due to the fact that it is not necessary
to have special expertise in transaction protocols or hidden
security leaks. Some basic knowledge in programming and
a little motivation are enough to be able to depredate other
peoples’ online accounts. We also saw that having a big set
of transaction data helps the attacker to hide his traces and
improves his chances to escape.
It further emerged that the customers support being attacked
by their behaving. This behavior was identified and explained.
We gave some proposals how the customer can increase the
security without any assistance of the online bank. Even
though these recommendations slightly increase the security,
we saw that they are trivial, uncomfortable or strange. In
addition they can not lift the level of security to a really high
level.
Next we saw that even the providers support the attacks.
They have defects in their implementations which ease at-
tacking their systems. Those flaws are not related to the
utilization of the PIN/TAN–system. But in combination with
the PIN/TAN–system they worsen the situation noticeably. It
is the providers’ task to patch these holes.
Finally we listed and explained the enervations of the
PIN/TAN–system. It exposed that the weak points are not
caused by the concrete attacked platform or the actual kind of
attack. They are inherent in the PIN/TAN–system. Thus, it is
not possible to utilize it in a really high secure internet transac-
tion system without further measurements. The providers must
introduce more secure systems.
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